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We present a model of efficient regulation along the lines of Demsetz (1967).  In this 
model, setting up and running regulatory institutions takes a fixed cost, and therefore 
jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have them.  
Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U.S. states have more pages of 
legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history.  We also find that specific types of 
regulation, including the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are 
more extensive in countries with larger populations.  Overall, the data show that population is an 
empirically important determinant of regulation.   
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    Population and Regulation 
Casey B. Mulligan and Andrei Shleifer 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In a classic paper, Demsetz (1967) argues that the creation of institutions is shaped by 
demand.  Introducing an institution only becomes efficient when the scale of an activity it 
supports becomes significant enough to cover the costs of creating and running it.   Using the 
example of Indians in the Quebec region circa 1700, Demsetz maintains that the aggregate value 
of fur trading explains the emergence of enforced land ownership rights.  In this paper, we show 
that Demsetz’s logic is quite general theoretically but also valid empirically.  We show that 
population of a community – our measure of the scale of various activities – is an important 
determinant of whether and how much these activities are regulated by that community.     
The focus on population as a determinant of regulation is uncommon in theoretical and 
empirical work.  Much of research on regulation has focused on contrasting public interest 
theories, in which regulation cures market failure (e.g., Pigou 1934), with public choice theories, 
in which regulation helps special interests to make money (e.g., Tullock 1967, Stigler 1971, 
Peltzman 1976, or McChesney 1987).  This work generally focuses on particular industries to 
understand the structure of regulation.   Our work is closer to the recent writings on regulation 
that see it as one strategy of enforcing good conduct, which needs to be compared to private 
orderings, dispute resolution in courts, and other enforcement strategies (e.g., Glaeser, Johnson 
and Shleifer 2001, Djankov et al. 2003).  However, that work ignores scale as a potentially 
important factor shaping public involvement.   Our purpose is to explore the implications of 
fixed organization, adoption, and enforcement costs of regulation on its use by focusing on total 
population of a community – a U.S. state or a country – as a determinant of its regulatory 
structure.  
Section II presents a simple model of the creation of regulation of different types.  The 
model establishes the relationship between population and regulation, but also permits a 
calculation of the population elasticity of regulation.  Section III presents our cross-state data on 
the amount of law, showing how bigger states regulate more activities and tend to regulate each 
activity in more detail.  Section IV revisits the previous literature on regulatory adoption, adding 2 
population to the list of explanatory variables, and shows how larger states tend to adopt 
regulations earlier.  Section V looks at five types of regulation across countries, showing how 
high population countries tend to regulate a given activity more.  Section VI extends the basic 
model to consider redistributive and not just efficient regulation, shows that many of the same 
insights apply, and presents some evidence on the empirical significance of that model.  Section 
VII concludes.  
 
II.  Regulation Creation in a Simple Model with Fixed Costs and Zipf’s Law 
 
Our starting point is the efficiency approach to regulation which holds, in broadest terms, 
that a society chooses to regulate an activity when doing so is cheaper than alternative strategies 
of addressing social problems.  Perhaps the simplest example of this approach, and one that we 
model, is resolution of disputes.  Consider a jurisdiction, such as a U.S. state, where people 
interact with each other, and sometimes have a dispute.  These disputes can be resolved in a 
number of ways.  They can be resolved completely privately, perhaps because neighbors want to 
get along (Elickson 1991) or because participants in a given industry have established a private 
ordering to facilitate business in the long run (Greif 1993, Bernstein 1992).   Alternatively, they 
can be resolved in court based on general principles of fairness, without any reference to 
legislation or regulation.   Both of these strategies of enforcing good conduct have much to 
recommend them, but sometimes they fail.  Private orderings are vulnerable to abuse of the weak 
by the strong;  mafia enforcement is an example.  Dispute resolution based on custom or 
common law is also expensive when application of general principles requires the assembly of a 
great deal of data and expertise.  When private orderings and common law do not work well, 
mutually beneficial transactions might not take place.  
As an efficient response to such problems, many societies introduce legislation and 
regulation, which delineate the rights and obligations of various parties in a community.   
Sometimes legislation just describes the rules of the game, and leaves the enforcement of these 
rules to private parties.   Its main function is to reduce the cost of settling disputes in court. In 
other instances, enforcement is also taken over by the state, as in the case of regulatory agencies.  
At least in some instances, legislation and regulation reduce the transaction costs of enforcing 
good conduct relative to private orderings and common law.  Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer 3 
(2001) argue, for example,  that regulation reduces enforcement costs because regulators have 
stronger incentives to enforce rules than do the judges.  Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) and LaPorta 
et al (2003) give examples of why “bright line rules” provided by regulation are easier to enforce 
– both publicly and privately – than torts.  For our purposes, we do not assume that regulation is 
always more efficient, or identify the exact transaction costs – it is sufficient that, in some 
instances, regulation does reduce these costs.  
As an example of this approach, consider the regulation of securities markets. In these 
markets, a crucial problem is the issuance of worthless securities to a poorly informed public by 
dishonest promoters and entrepreneurs.  One can argue that underwriter and issuer reputation 
would eliminate this risk, but in many countries they do not; the temptation to take the money 
and run is just too strong.  One can also argue that general principles of tort law, such as 
negligence, are sufficient to enforce good conduct and provide restitution to deceived investors.  
But in many cases, it is just too expensive to show that issuers and underwriters knew something 
material and negligently failed to disclose this information to investors.  The questions about 
materiality of undisclosed information, of underwriter responsibility, and of issuer and 
underwriter intent are very expensive to answer.  By delineating the exact duties of issuers and 
underwriters with respect to disclosure, and the exact burdens of proof on investors necessary to 
recover damages, a securities law can reduce the transaction costs of litigation, and thereby 
increase the level of activity in markets.  The evidence provided by La Porta et al. (2003) is 
broadly supportive of this efficiency interpretation of securities laws and regulation.    
Below we provide a formal model of regulation along the lines of this example, which 
helps us explore some of the implications of scale for the extent of regulation.  But we stress that 
the focus on efficient dispute resolution, as in the example above, is only illustrative.  First, 
regulation can in principle be a cost-reducing strategy for dealing with social problems in 
contexts other than just the resolution of disputes.  As the size of a community rises, even if it 
remains very homogeneous in terms of income, education, or occupations, the variety of 
situations in which community members find themselves also rises.  If a community wants to 
achieve some kind of uniformity of outcomes, it might resort to rules rather than markets or 
informal arrangements.  Formulating and enforcing such rules takes a fixed cost, but they reduce 
the marginal cost of achieving social objectives.  4 
Suppose, for example, that the issue is providing education for deaf children.  In a small 
community, parents might get together and collectively decide how best to educate one or two 
deaf children.  As the size of the community expands, so will the number of deaf children as well 
as the number of views their parents hold about the obligations of the community.  The efficient 
way to resolve these disagreements in a larger community might be to establish formal rules for 
how deaf children are educated rather than to mediate community preferences in each case.  As a 
second example, suppose that a country wants to raise an army.  The market for volunteers is 
available regardless of country size, just as it is for the private sector.  But the volunteer system 
may not fully achieve social objectives such as having an army representative of the nation’s 
whole population, or minimizing the costs of tax collection.  Once population becomes high 
enough, a country may find it worthwhile to pay the fixed costs of setting up and administering a 
draft system, so that it can turn away from the volunteer system for some of its military 
manpower needs. 
Second, it is not important for our results whether regulations serve public rather than 
special interests, only that some component of the fixed organization, adoption, and enforcement 
costs are among the determinants of the extent of regulation.  In our empirical work, we adopt 
this broader view of regulation, but in the model, we examine regulation as one a strategy for 
reducing the social cost of resolving disputes.  Section VI begins to explore the question of 
whether the effects of population might be different if regulation serves special rather than public 
interests. 
   Let c denote the amount by which a dispute’s resolution costs are reduced when there is 
legislation or regulation governing an activity.  Interactions, and hence the nature of disputes, are 
heterogeneous.  A day laborer’s interaction, and potential disputes, with his employer are 
different from those between a salaried employee and his employer.  We let t ∈ [0,∞) index the 
type of interaction that might occur in a community, or perhaps more literally the type of dispute 
that might occur.  The index t is ordered so that the more frequent disputes have lower values of 
t.  f(⋅) is a monotone decreasing density function, with f(t) describing the likelihood that a 5 
randomly chosen dispute is of type t.  When population is of size N, the total number of disputes 
of type t is Nf(t).
1 
This specification assumes the same function f across all communities, and that the 
ordering of activities on the t axis is the same everywhere, which is clearly not true.  Some 
communities specialize in particular economic activities or social groups.  In this case, what 
determines the adoption of regulation is not the total population, but the number of people who 
would benefit (efficiently) from the activity being regulated.   Moreover, communities might 
endogenously specialize in regulation, hoping to attract more of a given activity – as is the case 
with Delaware’s specialization in corporate law.  When we discuss empirical implications, we 
recognize that in some instances it is not the total population of the community, but rather the 
total affected population, that shapes the adoption of regulations.  
Creating and enforcing regulations pertaining to a dispute of type t costs r(t) = ρ + βNf(t).  
This can be interpreted either as a social cost, or as a politically-weighted average cost.  r(t) has a 
fixed component ρ, and a variable component βNf(t), which is proportional to the total number of 
disputes of type t.  For simplicity, we treat ρ, β, and c as constants even though in principle they 
can vary with GDP per capita or education.  
Under the assumption of efficiency, legislation pertaining to disputes of type t is created 
if and only if the aggregate cost savings c exceed the aggregate regulation cost: 
  Nf(t)c ≥ r(t) = ρ + βNf(t)  (1) 
If β ≥ c, there will be no regulation regardless of the dispute frequency or the population size. In 
particular, if c < 0, regulation is less efficient than private orderings or common law, and will not 
be adopted.  Accordingly, we focus on the activities for which β < c.
2   
Since, by assumption, f(⋅) is monotone decreasing, equation (1) implies that there is a 
critical value T such that there is regulation pertaining to all disputes t ≤ T, and no regulation 
pertaining to disputes t > T.  Hence, T is the total range of regulation, and is determined by the 
formula: 
 
                                                           
1For simplicity, we have assumed that there is one dispute per capita.  We could introduce a parameter indicating the 
number of disputes per capita, but it would just affect the measurement of the fixed regulation cost, rather then the 
regulation’s population gradient. 
2An interesting exercise in this case would be to think about forces that might lead to reductions in β.  Becker and 
Mulligan (2003) and Peltzman (1989) conclude, for example, that regulation increases in response to its own 
enhanced efficiency.   6 
 
The fraction of disputes that are subject to regulation is simply F(T).  Equation (2) says that 
regulation is increasing with population, and that the population elasticity is the same (in 
magnitude) as the fixed cost and variable cost elasticities. 
The presence of fixed costs implies that jurisdictions that regulate an activity tend to have 
larger populations.  In addition, if we fix a particular activity, such as the mining business, 
jurisdictions may vary according to exactly where mining is in their distribution f or what is the 
net variable cost (c-β) of not regulating.  For example, mining may be a common activity in West 
Virginia, but uncommon in Georgia, so that if it were not for the fixed cost, a larger fraction f of 
West Virginia’s population stands to benefit from mining regulation.  In this example, total 
affected population Nf(t) determines regulatory adoption, so that some states like West Virginia 
may regulate mining even though their overall population N is small.  More generally, some 
states with small overall populations will be among the states regulating a particular activity 
because of their large desired intensity (as measured by f, (c-β), or some combination).  




This Pareto distribution for disputes implies that the elasticity of the range of regulation T with 
respect to population is essentially constant and equal to 0.5.  The fraction F of disputes that are 
subject to regulation has population elasticity 0.5F/(1-F), which can be greater or less than 0.5, 
depending on the (hard to measure) relative frequency of regulated and unregulated disputes. 
One theoretical reason to expect the distribution of disputes to be Pareto with shape 
parameter near one derives from a simple “Gibrat’s Law” model of the growth and decline of 
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cities.  Empirically, various forms of human interactions seem to occur at frequencies that are 
pretty nearly Pareto with shape parameter one.  Examples include cities (Gabaix 1999), 
occupations,
4  homeowners insurance claims (Stuart 1983), and firm sizes (Axtel 2001). 
 
III. Regulation Across States Measured in KB’s 
 
Population and the Amount of Law  
One aggregate measure of regulation is the number of pages of law, made famous by Ronald 
Reagan in his first state of the union address when he recalled the reduction during his 
administration in the number of Federal Register pages.  To compute this indicator of regulation 
for states, we measure the number of kilobytes (KBs) of unannotated  state law in 37 states in 
2001, 2002, or 2003.  A kilobyte (KB) is 1024 bytes, and each byte represents a character.  For 
example “Thou shalt not kill.” is 20 bytes (including spaces and the period), or 0.0195 KB.  We 
found that one page of law is roughly one kilobyte of law, and the typical state has tens of 
thousands of kilobytes.
5  Appendix I describes our algorithm for counting KBs of law for the 
states, and explains why 13 states were excluded from the counting. 
Pages or KBs of law may measure the range of regulation T or, to the extent that the 
inframarginal disputes are regulated in more detail than the marginal ones, they may proxy for 
the fraction F of disputes that are subject to regulation.  In either case, our model calibrated with 
Zipf’s law says that the population elasticity should be about 0.5.  Although not included in our 
model, there may be a “necessary” range of activities like murder, elections, or traffic, that are 
regulated in some detail regardless of population, in which case we might expect the population 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3Equation (3) shows the regulation formula corresponding to a Pareto distribution f with shape parameter one.  If the 
shape parameter were α≠1, then the exponent on [(c-β)N/ρ] would be 1/(1+α) rather than 0.5.  Equation (3) applies 
only in the case where ρ<(c-β)N.  Otherwise the fixed component of cost is too large and we simply have T = 0. 
4We have calculated the 1990 Census PUMS distribution of workers by occupation, as 3-digit coded by the United 
States Census Bureau.  There are 247823 employed men aged 25-54 with occupation coded.  The most common 
code is 22 = “ Managers and administrators, n.e.c.,” for which there are 14874 observations (6.0% of the 
observations with occupation code).  The second most common code is 804= “truck drivers,” for which there are 
11007 observations (4.4% of the sample).  Overall, there are 191 occupation codes with a minimum of 249 
observations, or 0.1% of the sample.  In a graph (available upon request from the authors) of the occupation rank 
versus occupation frequency, using log scales, for the 191 occupations, we see nearly a straight line with slope -1.1, 
which means that the occupation types are distributed nearly Pareto with shape parameter near one. 
5There are three reasons to measure KB rather than pages.  First, not all states have their statutes published by the 
same publisher (or, within publisher, in the same format), so cross-state comparisons of pages would require 
adjustments for each publisher’s font size, formatting style, etc.  Second, some states have their total statutes 8 
elasticity to be less than 0.5 and then rise with population to approach 0.5 as the regulation 
moves significantly beyond the necessary range.  There is also a real possibility that a small state 
can adopt a regulation more cheaply by imitating the earlier-adopting large states.  Imitation 
induces a positive correlation between population and the cost of adopting certain types of 
regulation.  This positive correlation means that  the cross-state population elasticity may be less 
than 0.5, especially among the smaller states whose statutes consist mainly of the “imitated” 
regulations. 
The empirical relation between statute KB’s and population is shown in Figure 1.  The 
correlation (of the logs) is 0.88, and the overall regression elasticity is 0.31.  The comparison of 
Delaware and Wyoming, and of Texas and New York, illustrates the basic fact.  Delaware and 
Wyoming are similar in terms of total population, but different in terms of population density 
(Wyoming is the 2
nd least densely populated state, while Delaware is 7
th most).  Given that both 
of these states have a similar number of statute KBs, and both fit near the regression line, it 
seems that population is much more important than population density in determining regulation.  
Texas and New York offer a similar comparison, since they have the same population, similar 
numbers of statute KBs, while New York is about 6 times more dense than Texas.  Also notice 
that Delaware and New York state have similar population densities (almost 400 persons per 
square mile), but pages of statutes that differ by almost an order of magnitude, as predicted by 
our model.    
Table 1 examines the validity and the robustness of the relationship between population 
and regulation illustrated in Figure 1.  We include a southern state dummy, lawyers per capita, 
land area, income per capita, and several additional state characteristics as controls.  The 
relationship between population and regulation remains strong, and the coefficient stays near .3.   
Southern states have fewer KB’s of law.  More law and more lawyers go together.
6  T h e  
regressions in Table 1 do not show any significant effect of income per capita on KB’s of law.  
This is a surprising result, especially in light of the fact that Demsetz (1967) and North (1981) 
generally think of the aggregate level of economic activity as a determinant of adoption of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
published irregularly, and publish only additions and retractions in the meantime.  Third, bytes can be calculated (as 
described below) by computer and potentially be dis-aggregated by statute type. 
6The number of lawyers is likely to be correlated with other determinants of number of laws.  However, including 
this variable does not affect the estimated population elasticity because population and lawyers per capita happen to 
be uncorrelated. Appendix II explains how lawyers per capita are measured from the 1990 Census.  Another 9 
institutions.  Indeed, our model’s focus on population rather than aggregate activity distinguishes 
it from the earlier work.  One reason that population rather than income may matter for 
regulation is that, as income rises, so do real wages and therefore the fixed labor cost of setting 
up and running a regulatory institution.  If the fixed costs rise as fast as do the aggregate benefits 
per capita, population rather than income determines the adoption of a regulation.
7 
Alesina and Spolaore (2003) present a model of the determinants of country size, in 
which the benefits of spreading the fixed costs of a particular policy among more people are 
traded off against the inefficiency of implementing uniform policies in a heterogeneous 
population.  In their view, population is positively correlated with heterogeneity such as ethnic 
diversity.  In our model, population is a proxy for a different kind of heterogeneity – namely the 
likelihood of having at least some minimum number of people engaged in esoteric activities – 
which could be found in a large jurisdiction even if it were very homogeneous in terms of race, 
geography, education, or income.  Empirically for U.S. states, does population proxy for 
heterogeneity and if so which kind?  Specifications (1)-(3) suggest that population does not 
proxy for heterogeneity as measured by income inequality, occupational diversity, the 
importance of cities, or the prevalence of racial minorities, because these measures do not predict 
KB’s or affect the estimated population elasticity.
8 
Figure 1 also does not readily tell us whether the amount of law in a state today depends 
on its current population or, since statutes accumulate over time, the population it had in the 
distant past and/or the number of years the state has existed (as a state).  As shown in Table 1, 
these two variables (the former measured as 1920 population) have no power to predict statute 
KB’s conditional on current population.   We also include log of the number seats in each state’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
measure of lawyers per capita for 2003 from the American Bar Association (2003) also does not help predict KB’s 
of law, in part because it records (unlike the Census) NY and MA as extreme outliers. 
7We are aware of only two studies that use absolute population as a determinant of regulation.  Among the variables 
they use to predict adoption of “general incorporation code” by U.S. states, Shughart and Tollison (1985) include 
both aggregate population and aggregate manufacturing income (both in levels, with population measured in 
different years for different states).  They find that populous states adopt later and states with more manufacturing 
income earlier, so it is hard to tell from their results whether populous states adopted earlier or later (we find the raw 
correlation between year of adoption and log 1910 population to be -0.55).  McCormick and Tollison (1981) use 
absolute size of legislature to predict occupational licensing, and note that Stigler (1976) used absolute population to 
predict the size of legislature. 
8See Appendix II for details on constructing the heterogeneity measures.  We have also tried various measures of 
earnings inequality from the 1990 Census PUMS, and the fractions of income and employment in agriculture, with 
similar results. 10 
House and Senate, in case the amount of law depends on the number of lawmakers which just 
happens to be correlated with population.
9   This control does not matter either.  
Our model says that the population elasticity of regulation is 0.5, while the estimated 
elasticities shown in the first few columns of Table 1 are lower.  We discussed above how in 
theory the elasticity may be smaller among the small states, and about 0.5 among the large states, 
because small states have regulations that are “necessary” or “imitable” from the big states.  
Figure 1 suggests, and specifications (4) and (5) confirm, that a larger elasticity in fact prevails 
among the larger states.  Specification (4) is for the entire 37 state sample, and without the 
various controls other than Southern, and displays an elasticity of 0.33.  Specification (5) throws 
out the 20 of the 37 states with below median population (i.e., states with a smaller 2000 
population than Kentucky’s 4,041,000), and displays an elasticity of 0.46.  Although not shown 
in the Table, the estimated population elasticity is similar if we cut the sample at 3, 5, or 6 
million rather then 4,041,000. 
 
What Do KB’s of Law Represent? 
There are two reasons we believe that pages of statutes are correlated with the real 
amount of regulation.  First, the aggregate time series of Federal Register pages (the Federal 
Register consists of new laws passed by Congress, executive orders, and federal government 
agency reports) deviates significantly from its trend during exactly those periods (since 1936) 
when it is commonly believed that federal regulation was accelerating the most – World War II 
and the 1970's.  Second, as we show in Section IV, the population gradient seen in Figure 1 also 
appears in studies of the history of states’ adoption of various laws, including occupational 
licensing, telegraph regulation, and worker’s compensation.  However, regulations like these 
diffuse pretty quickly from small to large states and, at least in the case of occupational licensing, 
the cross-state regulation-population gradient falls over time as regulation diffuses.  Hence the 
pages we measure in 2003 may not have much to do with the adoption of regulations like 
occupational licensing and worker’s compensation that began their diffusion decades ago, but 
rather with the adoption in more recent areas of regulation, with further elaboration of old 
regulations, or with the adoption of esoteric regulations by the big states that may never diffuse 
to the smaller ones. 
                                                           
9Log seats is more correlated with log 1920 population than with log 2000 population. 11 
IL and IN are an interesting comparison, as the states are similar in many ways, except 
that IL has twice the population.  Both states are near the regression line; IL has 40% more bytes 
of law than IN.  Part of this difference is that IL has almost twice the bytes of criminal law and 
corrections.
10  Can these byte counts be attributed to a number of activities that are legal in IN 
and illegal in IL?  Or do both prohibit the same set of activities and IL is just more detailed in its 
regulation of them?  Several examples suggest that both differences are present. 
Relative to IN, IL has many acts devoted to pretty minor issues (such as the “Coin Slug 
Act” and the “Peephole Installation Act”).
11  Among the issues covered in the criminal law of 
both states, IL seems to regulate them in more detail.  For example, IL has 359 KB devoted to 
drug offenses while IN has only 124 KB.
12  Included among IL’s 359 KB is an entire “Drug 
Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act” (22 KB) devoted to the forfeiture of assets by persons involved 
in drug offenses, where IN has only a Civil Law chapter “Forfeiture of Property Used in 
Violation of Certain Criminal Statutes” (21 KB) on the seizing of assets of criminals, and this 
chapter applies to all kinds of criminals, including thieves, (media) pirates, smugglers, and 
terrorists. 
Consider offenses related to animal fighting.  IN has only a few sections (totaling 2 KB) 
in a chapter “Offenses Relating to Animals,” while IL has a criminal section “Dog Fighting” plus 
two sections of the “Human Care for Animals Act” (with all three fighting sections totaling 11 
KB).  The IN statutes prohibit promotion, use of animals, or attendance with animal (or without) 
at animal fighting contests, and the possession of animal fighting paraphernalia.  Conducting or 
attending a dog fight is also explicitly illegal in IL, but so is a whole range of other activities 
connected to dog fighting.  Namely, IL explicitly prohibits a person to: 
(a) “own, capture, breed, train, or lease a dog” for fighting, 
(b) “promote, conduct, carry on, advertise, collect money for or in any other manner 
assist or aid in the presentation” of a dog fight, 
                                                           
10From the annotated statutes (not used for the KB counts cited in the text) we see that IL has many more 
annotations to its criminal law and corrections than does IN. 
11IN covers coin slugs under a wider law regarding “Forgery, Fraud, and Other Deceptions” in reference to a slug 
that might be “deposited in a coin machine.”  IL’s Coin Slug Act explicitly references “slug, washer, disc, token, 
string, cord or wire or by means of any false, counterfeited, mutilated, sweated or foreign coin, or by any means, 
method, trick, or device whatsoever not lawfully authorized by the owner of such coin box telephone, coin operated 
transit turnstile or transit fare box.”  In addition, IL has a “Telephone Coin Box Tampering Act.” 
To our knowledge, IN has no statute covering peephole installation (apartment units must be built with peepholes 
for the occupants to see out). 
12Results are similar if we use statutes inclusive of annotations: IL has 426 drug pages while IN has 147. 12 
(c) “sell or offer for sale, ship, transport, or otherwise move, or deliver or receive any dog 
which he or she knows has been captured, bred, or trained, or will be used, to fight another dog 
or human,” 
(d) “manufacture for sale, shipment, transportation, or delivery any device or equipment 
which he or she knows or should know is intended for use in any [dog fight],” 
(e) “possess, sell or offer for sale, ship, transport, or otherwise move any [dog fighting 
equipment],” 
(f) “make available any site, structure, or facility, whether enclosed or not, that he or she 
knows is intended to be used for the purpose of conducting [a dog fight]”. 
 
IL law also details the procedures for sheltering animals found in connection with the 
enforcement of the animal fighting statutes. 
The IN-IL comparison is likely to be representative of the population-animal regulation 
gradient for all 50 states.  We have counted words of statute devoted to animal fighting for 37 
states.  Regressing log animal fighting words on log 2000 population and a dummy for south 
yields coefficients of 0.30 (s.e.=0.14) and 0.02 (s.e.=0.30), respectively.
13  The population 
elasticity for animal laws is the same as that for all laws combined. 
 
IV. Evidence on Population and the Diffusion of Regulation Across States 
 
Our model predicts that the regulatory difference between the more and the less 
populated states would be in the regulation of the interactions that are relatively infrequent, or 
that have relatively small net benefits.  In the previous section, we have tested and confirmed this 
proposition using data on modern state statutes.  Another approach is to look at the introduction 






                                                           
13Coefficient estimates are similar if we include proxies for the importance of agriculture. 13 
Patterns of Adoption: Occupation and Industry Regulation 
Stigler (1971) looks at the licensing of 37 occupations in the 48 mainland U.S. states.  He 
predicts the year a state licenses an occupation using the prevalence and urbanization of that 
occupation in the state, and occupation fixed effects.  Our model suggests that total population, 
or the absolute size of the occupation, should be added to the licensing year regressions.   
Roughly speaking, the difference between Stigler’s specification and that suggested by our 
model is the inclusion of log total population as regressor in addition to, or instead of, 
occupational prevalence.
14  When we regress year of licensing on occupation dummies, the 
fraction of the population living in cities, and the log of 1910 population, the estimated 
population elasticity is -2.13 (standard error clustered by state = 0.55).  Larger states tended to 
license occupations earlier. 
To obtain an indicator of how pages of occupational regulation might have varied with 
population at various points in history, we transform Stigler’s data set into repeated cross-
sections.  The year y cross-section lists states and the fraction of the 37 occupations it has 
licensed as of year y.  The population elasticity is positive in the various cross-sections and, not 
surprisingly, is higher during the peak licensing years 1900-20.  For example, the cross-state 
regression of fraction occupations licensed by 1850 on log 1950 population yields a coefficient 
of .005 (OLS standard error = .002).  The regression coefficients are .031 (s.e.=.010) and .018 
(s.e.=.015) if we measure occupations licensed as of 1910 and 1950, respectively.
15  This pattern 
suggests that the population-pages gradient we observe in 2002 derives more from regulations 
that are at the peak of their diffusion (or esoteric regulations adopted by big states that will never 
diffuse), than from regulations that mainly diffused years ago – like the licensing of Stigler’s 37 
occupations.                                                                                                                                                                
Other evidence is broadly consistent with our findings on Stigler’s data.  Nonnenmacher 
(2001) looks at the adoption of telegraph regulation circa 1850.  Figure 2 graphs total state 
population, measured in 1850 and on a  log scale, versus the year of first telegraph regulation for 
                                                           
14Stigler did not enter occupational prevalence (total number of persons practicing the occupation divided by total 
labor force) in log form, but if he had, and occupation size were normalized by population rather than labor force, 
then his specification and ours would differ only by a log population term.  Stigler’s estimated occupational 
prevalence coefficient was statistically insignificant.  Another reason we emphasize log population, rather than log 
occupation size, as a regressor is that licensing may affect occupation size more readily than it affects population. 
15Results are similar if we measure population in 1910 instead of 1950: the log population coefficients are .005, 
.031, and .011 for occupations licensed as of 1850, 1910, and 1950, respectively.  Note that less than 1% of state-14 
each of the 32 U.S. states at the time.  As expected, the populous states like NY, PA, MA, and 
VA were early adopters, and the last adopters (TX, FL, MN, IA, AR) were relatively 
unpopulated.  The correlation between year of first law and log population is -0.56 (t-stat=3.73). 
More populous states were also quicker to regulate working hours of women.  Figure 3 
graphs Landes’ (1980, Table 1) report of the year of first maximum female working hours 
legislation against (log scaled) 1890 population.  The correlation is -0.34 (t-stat=2.3).  Among 
the 23 states for which Landes reports there being a minimum wage law for women, the 
correlation between year of first minimum wage law and log population is -0.29 (t-stat=1.0).  
TX, ND, DC, AR, and KS had an average 1890 population of 1.0 million and were the last of the 
13 to legislate a minimum wage, while MA passed the first law and had an 1890 population of 
2.2 million. 
 
Population or Affected Population? 
In Section II, we noted that the exact specification of the model might be too narrow, and 
that what matters for efficiency is the size of the population (and the number of interactions and 
conflicts) affected by a given regulation.  Some evidence indeed supports this view.  
Worker’s compensation provides an interesting application of our analysis, because the 
population relevant for determining whether there will be worker’s compensation regulation – 
namely, the individuals likely to be hurt in workplace accidents – can be quite different from the 
total state population, especially in the early 20
th century when states were first taking up these 
laws.  For example, the 1910 Census shows Wyoming’s ranking 47
th out of 48 in terms of total 
population, but 29
th out of 48 in terms of total number of persons working as miners (a group 
likely to experience serious work injury).  Figure 4 graphs total state miners found in the 1910 
Census PUMS, on a log scale, against the year of first workers’ compensation law (from 
Fishback and Kantor 2000, Table 4.3) for each of the 48 U.S. states at the time.  The correlation 
is -0.27 (t-stat = 1.9).  If we regress year of first law on log miners and miners per capita, log 
miners is the more important variable: the t-statistics on the regression coefficients are -1.5 and -
0.5, respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
occupations were licensed as of 1850.  The highest licensing rates were 1900-20, when more than one percent of the 
1776 state-occupation cells became licensed each year. 15 
The size of the affected population also predicts which states were early to pass 
legislation “prohibiting discrimination  in employment on the grounds of race, creed, color, or 
national origin” (Landes 1968, p. 507).  When Landes wrote, 18 northern states had laws and 
agencies to enforce them.  As Table 2's “enforceable” column shows, the average 1950 black 
population in these states was 171,615, and three quarters of these states had at least 100,011 
blacks.  The four northern states with discrimination laws but no commission to enforce them 
(ID, ME, MT, VT) were much smaller – each had roughly 1,000 blacks.  North Dakota and 
South Dakota were the only Northern states without laws; their black populations were 257 and 
727, respectively.  Table 2 is consistent with our hypothesis that small states are late to adopt 
regulation.  However, in this case total population is correlated with population frequency; the 
last row of the Table shows that the regulating states were not only populous, but also had 
relatively large black population percentages.
16 
 
V. Population and Regulation Across Countries 
 
A few studies have tried to measure regulations for a broad cross-section of countries.  
Here we briefly analyze the employment laws index of Botero et al (2003), the business entry 
regulation index of Djankov et al (2002), the death penalty measures of Mulligan et al (2004), 
and measures of military conscription.  Table 3 reports one cross-country regression in each 
column.  The columns differ according to their regulation measure (one of the four referenced 
above), and to whether a broader set of political variables (namely “left power”) are included.  
The broadest sample is the 127 country “MGX” sample of Mulligan et al (2004), but includes 
only measures of death penalty, population, British legal origin, GDP per capita, democracy, 
whether a country belongs to Kornai’s (1992) list of communist states, and some information 
about military activities. A narrower 71 country “LaPorta” sample of Botero et al. (2003) and 
Djankov et al. (2002) includes the regulation measures from those studies and a political measure 
of “left power”.
17 
                                                           
16Interestingly, among the 28 states with enforceable legislation, the correlation of year of first law with log total 
black population (black population share) is -0.26 (-0.11), respectively. 
17Botero et al (2003) and Djankov et al (2002) have 85 countries. We exclude the former Soviet republics, Vietnam, 
and Lebanon, due to insufficient data on GDP for the years 1960-90. 16 
Specifications (1)-(4) suggest that, holding constant legal origin, GDP per capita, 
democracy, and communism, more populous countries have more business entry procedures, 
employment regulations, and are more likely to have the death penalty.  The results on business 
entry procedures and labor regulations are particularly supportive of our model since, generally 
speaking, incremental regulations in these areas cover more “issues” that might arise in the 
course of economic activity.  Consistent with our model, a small jurisdiction might not think it 
worthwhile to deal with these issues through regulation, but a larger jurisdiction faces enough 
demand to cover the fixed costs.   
Military conscription, as an addition to the volunteer army,
18 is a common form of 
reliance on regulation rather than contract to meet social objectives.  Furthermore it is relatively 
easy to measure for a large panel of countries – on both the intensive and extensive margins.  We 
obtain data on the existence of the draft, and on the number of draftees for 138 countries for the 
years 1985, 1990, and 1995 from The Military Balance published annually by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies.  Following Ross (1994), we use measures of the size of the Armed 
Forces, democracy, and economic development as predictors of a country’s reliance on 
conscription.
19  Specifications (5) and (6) are like the previous four specifications, except that 
some military activity variables are added to the list of independent variables, and that the 
dependent variable is the fraction of years 1985, 90, and 95 enlisting conscripts in the armed 
forces.  The common law effect, which is large and significant in all specifications, is broadly 
consistent with the general finding that, in labor as well as other markets, common law countries 
are more likely to rely on contract and less on regulation to achieve social goals (Djankov et al 
2002, Botero et al. 2003).  
The population effect is large, significant, and consistent with our theory in the sample of 
127 countries.  However, once we restrict attention to the subsample of 71 countries for which 
we have measures of left power, the size of the effect falls and its significance disappears.  This 
is a consequence of using the subsample of richer and more democratic countries: the correlation 
between left power and log population is -.02 in the smaller sample, so omitting the left power 
                                                           
18To our knowledge, all militaries have some volunteers.  For example, among the 68 countries in our sample having 
conscription (and reporting data on the number of draftees), the typical military force is about half volunteer and half 
drafted.  The lowest volunteer intensities were in Senegal, Switzerland, Turkey, and Cyprus, where 5, 9, 15, and 15 
percent, respectively, of their armed forces were volunteers.  Hence, the question is not a volunteer versus a draft 
system, but whether to have a draft system supplement the volunteer system. 17 
variable has essentially no effect on the left power coefficient.  We also find that, when a country 
uses the draft, it uses it intensively, especially when the country is small (results not reported in 
the Table).  Among the countries with less than median population and having a draft, 75% have 
more conscripts than volunteers.  This observation is consistent with fixed costs of having a draft 
system, and inconsistent with the hypothesis that small countries just happen to intend to use the 
draft lightly. 
 
VI. An Extension to the Politics of Regulation 
 
We can extend the model to consider regulatory incidence.  We suppose that each type of 
interaction involves two types of agents, whom we (arbitrarily) call “producers” and 
“consumers.”  For this purpose, we simplify our analysis by assuming that the fixed cost is 
entirely a cost of mobilizing an interest group to pass legislation, and that consumers and 
producers do not mobilize cooperatively.  Each group faces a fixed cost of organizing, which we 
denote ρ and ρ′ for producers and consumers respectively, and normalize group identities so that 
ρ < ρ′.
20  The social variable costs of regulating or not regulating are, as above, β and c, 
respectively.  If only one of the groups organizes, regulation is passed and the organized group 
receives fraction θ > 0.5 of the variable social surplus (β-c)Nf(t).  If both groups organize, they 
divide the variable surplus evenly. 
The producers have the greater incentive to organize to push for regulation of an 
unregulated activity. Their criterion for organizing is an equation exactly like (1), except that the 
variable cost parameters β and c are multiplied by the sharing parameter θ.  The total quantity of 
regulation T is then determined by an equation exactly like (2), except that the variable surplus 
term (β-c) is multiplied by the sharing parameter θ, and we can derive all of the results cited 
above.  Note that, when θ > 1, the marginal regulations add to net social cost.  For this reason, 
we refer to the regulation created by one party alone as “redistributive” and that created by both 
parties as “efficient,” even though for some parameters even the “redistributive” regulation 
reduces social costs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
19We have also used government spending/GDP and the share of the population over the age of 65, and obtained 
similar results. 18 
Because they have the larger organization cost, the consumers’ organization decision  
involves not the tradeoff between regulation or not, but how the regulation surplus should be 
shared.  When consumers are near the margin of being organized, the producers are already 
organized, so consumer organization serves the purpose of raising consumers’ variable surplus 
from regulation by the amount (θ-0.5)(β-c)Nf(t), and lowering the variable surplus of the 
producers by the same amount.  Consumers trade this benefit off against their organization cost 
ρ′.  The scope of “efficient” regulation Te is calculated in much the same way as we calculate T: 
 
The quantity of redistributive regulation is T-Te.  F(T) is, as above, the total fraction of 
interactions regulated, F(Te) is the fraction of interactions regulated in an efficient way, and the 
difference is the fraction of activities regulated in a redistributive way. 
Both  T and Te increase with population.  The ratio Te/T can either rise or fall with 
population, depending on the distribution of interactions.  With the shape-one Pareto distribution, 
Te is essentially proportional to T, with the proportion determined by the relative fixed costs and 
the sharing parameter θ: 
 
Figure 5 graphs formula (2) (amended to multiply (c-β)  by the sharing parameter θ) and 
the formula (4), showing how population, activity type, and the model parameters determine 
whether and how an activity is regulated.  Activities are unregulated above the solid line and 
regulated below the solid line.  The dashed line partitions the regulated activities into those 
regulated in an efficient vs. a redistributive way.  Both schedules slope up, which implies three 
things.  First, in a given jurisdiction, the infrequent activities are less likely to be regulated.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
20The costs of political organization are not well understood, but one possibility is that producers organize more 
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Second, fixing the type of interaction (moving horizontally in Figure 5), smaller jurisdictions are 
less likely to have any regulation.  Third, conditional on having a regulation of a given type 
(moving horizontally in Figure 5, in the region to the right of the solid schedule), the smaller 
jurisdictions are more likely to have redistributive regulations.  The last result is intimately 
related to Becker’s (1983) model of government policy, which holds that, when more interest 
groups with countervailing interests form, government policy becomes more efficient as a 
broader range of interests is articulated. 
 
Do Small States have More Redistributive Regulation?  The Case of Attorney Licenses 
Our model distinguishes the margin of adopting a regulation (equation 2) from the 
margin determining whether a regulation is efficient or redistributive (equation 4).  Small states 
are less likely to regulate a given activity but, conditional on regulating, more likely to regulate 
in a redistributive way.  For some evidence on this point, we look at the regulation of lawyers. 
Because every state has licensing requirements for its lawyers, the operative margin is the degree 
to which those requirements redistribute income.  Tenn (2002) has created, for 48 states and the 
three Census years 1970-90, an index of the degree to which licensing laws might raise the 
incomes of lawyers.  He considers whether obtaining a license requires an examination, the 
difficulty of the examination, whether a lawyer must have a degree from an American Bar 
Association approved school, the residency requirements, and the amount of the bar exam fee, to 
form his index of licensing strictness, with stricter licensing delivering a higher value for the 
index.  We calculate each state’s time-averaged index, and graph it in Figure 6 versus log 1970 
population.  It appears that larger states have less strict regulations; the correlation is -0.27 (t-
stat=-2.0). 
 
VII. Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have presented a model of efficient regulation along the lines of 
Demsetz (1967).  In this model, setting up and running regulatory institutions takes a fixed cost, 
and therefore jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely 
to have them.  We then tested the model using data from both U.S. states and countries around 
the world.  We found that higher population U.S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt 20 
particular laws earlier in their history.  We also found that specific types of regulation, including 
the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in 
countries with larger populations.  Overall, the data show that population is an empirically 
important determinant of regulation, consistent with the theory.   
The results in this paper naturally raise the question of optimal regulatory jurisdictions.   
In both the efficiency and redistribution versions of our model, having a larger jurisdiction is 
better.  In the efficiency model, regulation reduces the marginal cost of addressing social 
problems and so, with larger jurisdictions, a greater range of such problems is addressed 
efficiently.  In the redistributive model of regulation, more interests are articulated when the 
jurisdiction is larger.  However, in more general models, it no longer needs to be true that larger 
jurisdictions are always optimal.   Competition among jurisdictions as in Tiebout (1956) or 
diversity of preferences among people (Alesina and Spolaore 2003) are arguments favoring 
smaller jurisdictions.  Even with these considerations, however, our evidence suggests that the 
choice of an optimal jurisdiction must in part be determined by population. 
Many of these results are most naturally interpreted from the efficiency perspective, but 
some evidence is also consistent with the public choice theories of regulation, in which the 
relevant fixed cost is that of organization rather than enforcement.  The results also suggest that, 
because of increasing returns in regulation, we would expect to observe regulatory specialization, 
particularly in activities that can cheaply travel across jurisdictions.  Delaware’s specialization in 
corporate law is broadly consistent with the perspective of this model.  Regardless of the exact 
model of fixed costs, the evidence is broadly supportive of the view that overcoming such costs 
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Appendix I: Algorithm for Counting KB’s of Law 
 
Statute Types 
There are two main formats for publishing state laws – “annotated” and “unannotated.”  
The former are most commonly found in libraries – presumably because they are more useful to 
lawyers – and contain the text of each statute in effect at a point in time, plus some of the 
precedents that have affected interpretation of the statute and perhaps information about previous 
versions of the statute.  The unannotated statutes contain only the text of the statute.  Since we 
are interested in the relation between regulation and population, the distinction between 
annotated and unannotated statutes is important.  A populous state is more likely to have had a 
court case that tested a particular statute, so we expect the quantity of annotations to increase 
with population.  
 
Computer Algorithm for Counting KB’s of Law 
Every state has unannotated statutes available for browsing on the internet.  The browsing 
is either in html, java, or pdf format, or in multiple formats.  Our computer programs can only 
browse the internet in html format, so we were unable to make counts for 9 states which had 
laws on-line only in java format.
21  The byte counts of pdf files exceed the number of characters 
in the file (due to formatting), so we exclude the two states (Kentucky and North Dakota) for 
which on-line statutes are only in pdf format.  The final two states, Georgia and New Hampshire, 
were excluded from the sample even though they had html statutes available, because they were 
not in a format accessible by our programs.  As we show below, the 13 states excluded from our 
data set are very similar to the 37 included in terms of population and many other characteristics. 
Statutes on-line are usually presented in a tree format, where users first browse a list of 
titles, for each title a list of chapters, etc., with the final nodes in the tree being the actual texts of 
laws.  The tree format can be used to categorized formats by their legal classification, for 
example, tax, criminal, schools, occupations, or estates.  States differ in terms of the number of 
levels in the tree, the number of final nodes used to present a given set of statutes, and hence the 
number of statutes and KB of statutes per final node.  For example, New York has less than 
                                                           
21Those 9 states are Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Virginia, Wisconsin.  
A number of states have both java and html statutes on line, including AR, CA, SD, TN. 25 
4,000 final nodes, and South Dakota more than 40,000, even while the former has a lot more 
statutes than the latter.  Since each html page usually includes headers and footers, this implies 
that the number of KB of html required to present a given set of statutes expands significantly 
with the number of html pages on which those statutes are presented.  For example, SD has more 
bytes devoted to headers and footers than actual statutes, whereas NY has more than 80 bytes of 
actual statutes per byte of header or footer.
22  We therefore count statutes KB in four steps: 
(1) A computer program automatically browses the entire html tree presenting a state’s statutes, 
and downloads each www page from the tree, stripped of html tags.  The statutes browsed were 
those in effect in 2001, 2002, or 2003.
23 
(2) A sample of downloads are visually inspected for a number of bytes of headers and footers 
on a typical html page. 
(3) The number of html pages is multiplied by the result from step (2) to give total KB of headers 
and footers, and then subtracted from the total KB downloaded in step (1). 
(4) If applicable, the aggregate KB of annotations are estimated as in steps (2) and (3), and then 
subtracted from the total. 
 
As a result, we interpret our KB counts as number of KB (and hence, roughly the number of 
pages) of unannotated statutes, exclusive of headers and footers, but inclusive of tables of 






                                                           
22A typical html page from SD statutes reads: 
“32-5-10.2.   Motorcycle safety education fee -- Deposit in special revenue fund. The county treasurer shall remit to 
the department the motorcycle safety education fees collected pursuant to §   32-5-10.1. The fees shall be deposited 
in the state treasury in a special revenue fund for use as specified in §   32-20-14. 
Statutes Menu | FAQ | My Legislative Research | Privacy Policy | LRC Menu  This page is maintained by the 
Legislative Research Council. It contains material authorized for publication that is copyrighted by the state of South 
Dakota. Except as authorized by federal copyright law, no person may print or distribute copyrighted material 
without the express authorization of the South Dakota Code Commission”, where we have italicized the actual 
statute.  The non-italicized portion is 523 bytes, so we subtract 523 bytes per SD www page of law. 
23The only exception is VT, for which we counted statutes in effect as of 1995.  Including year of statute in the 
regressions has no impact on the results. 26 
Appendix II: U.S. States Data Sources 
 
1920 population by state.  University of Virginia Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, plus AK 
& HI from Texas A&M University (2002). 
1990 and 2000 population by state.  Census Bureau (2001). 
south  Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West 
Virginia 
lawyers per capita.  1990 Census PUMS weighted number of persons aged 25-54 and reporting 
working in 1989 and reporting occupation code 178 
land area square miles from http://www.imagesoft.net/flags/usstate1.html 
90-10 family income differential.  10
th and 90
th percentiles of the within-state household income 
distribution, from the March 2001 CPS (referring to year 2000 income).  The 90
th percentile is 
divided by the 10
th percentile, and the ratio is used in log form in the regressions. 
fraction of labor force coded with just 75 occupation codes.  Labor force is 1990 Census PUMS 
persons aged 25-54, reporting work in 1989, and reporting an occupation.  The fraction used is 
the ratio of total labor force persons in a state’s 75 largest occupation codes to total labor force. 
fraction of labor force employed in agriculture.  year 2000 from Statistical Abstract of the United 
States 2001, 2002; Census 2000 Summary File 1, 2 at http://factfinder.census.gov 
fraction of population urban, white.  year 2000, sources above 
income per capita.  year 2000, personal income, sources above 
number of state senators and representatives.  year 2002 from Book of the States 







Appendix Table: Summary Statistics for U.S. State Data 
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Notes: (a) dependent variable is log of number of kilobytes of law (c. 2000), except in the last column which is a 
dprobit for inclusion in our 36 state sample.  constant terms are estimated for each specification, but not 
displayed in the table 
(b) specification (5) limits sample to states with year 2000 population at least the median 





Table 2: Northern States, Classified by 





Employment Discrimination Law 
 







































enforceable states: AK, AZ, CA, CO, CT, HI, IL, IN, IA, KS, MA, MI, MN, MO, NE, 
NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, OH, OR, PA, RI, UT, WA, WI, WY. 
no commission states: ID, ME, MT, VT.  states w/o a law: ND, SD 
Source: Landes (1968) 
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Notes: (a) dependent variable is either log of business entry procedures, employment laws index, fraction of years 1976-90 that Amnesty International codes 
says there was a "retentionist" death penalty policy, or fraction of years 1985, 90, 95 having conscription. 
(b) OLS standard errors are in paren. 
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1E2 1E3 1E4 1E5
1970 population
ME
NH
VT
MA
CT
RI
NY
NJ
PA
DE
MD
VA
WV
NC
SC
GA
FL
AL
MS
KY
TN
OH
MI
IN
IL
WI
MN
IA
MO
ND
SD
NE
KS
AR
LA
OK
TX
MT
ID
WY
CO
NM
UT
AZ
NV
CA
OR
WA